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O
ver the past century and a 
half, we have made enormous 
progress in assembling 
a coherent picture of genetic 
evolution—that is, changes in the pools 
of genetic information possessed by 
populations, the genetic differentiation 
of populations (speciation) (see 
summaries in [1,2]), and the 
application of that understanding to 
the physical evolution of Homo sapiens 
and its forebears ([3]; e.g., [4,5]). But 
human beings, in addition to being 
products of biological evolution, are—
vastly more than any other organisms—
also products of a process of “cultural 
evolution.” Cultural evolution 
consists of changes in the nongenetic 
information stored in brains, stories, 
songs, books, computer disks, and 
the like. Despite some important ﬁ  rst 
steps, no integrated picture of the 
process of cultural evolution that has 
the explanatory power of the theory of 
genetic evolution has yet emerged. 
Much of the effort to examine 
cultural evolution has focused on 
interactions of the genetic and cultural 
processes (e.g., [6], see also references 
in [7]). This focus, however, provides 
a sometimes misleading perspective, 
since most of the behavior of our 
species that is of interest to policy 
makers is a product of the portion 
of cultural evolution [8] that occurs 
so rapidly that genetic change is 
irrelevant. There is a long-recognized 
need both to understand the process 
of human cultural evolution per se 
and to ﬁ  nd ways of altering its course 
(an operation in which institutions 
as diverse as schools, prisons, and 
governments have long been engaged). 
In a world threatened by weapons 
of mass destruction and escalating 
environmental deterioration, the need 
to change our behavior to avoid a 
global collapse [9] has become urgent. 
A clear understanding of how cultural 
changes interact with individual actions 
is central to informing democratically 
and humanely guided efforts to 
inﬂ  uence cultural evolution. While 
most of the effort to understand that 
evolution has come from the social 
sciences, biologists have also struggled 
with the issue (e.g., p. 285 of [10], 
[11–16], and p. 62 of [17]). We argue 
that biologists and social scientists 
need one another and must collectively 
direct more of their attention to 
understanding how social norms 
develop and change. Therefore, we 
offer this review of the challenge in 
order to emphasize its multidisciplinary 
dimensions and thereby to recruit a 
broader mixture of scientists into a 
more integrated effort to develop a 
theory of change in social norms—and, 
eventually, cultural evolution as a 
whole.
What Are the Relevant Units 
of Culture?
Norms (within this paper understood 
to include conventions or customs) 
are representative or typical patterns 
and rules of behavior in a human 
group [18], often supported by legal 
or other sanctions. Those sanctions, 
norms in themselves, have been 
called “metanorms” when failure to 
enforce them is punished [17,19,20]. 
In our (liberal) usage, norms are 
standard or ideal behaviors “typical” 
of groups. Whether these indeed 
represent the average behaviors 
of individuals in the groups is an 
open question, and depends on 
levels of conformity. Conformity or 
nonconformity with these norms 
are attributes of individuals, and, 
of course, heterogeneity in those 
attributes is important to how norms 
evolve. Norms and metanorms 
provide a cultural “stickiness” (p. 10 
of [21]) or viscosity that can help 
sustain adaptive behavior and retard 
detrimental changes, but that equally 
can inhibit the introduction and spread 
of beneﬁ  cial ones. It is in altering 
normative attitudes that changes can be 
implemented.
Here, we review the daunting 
problem of understanding how norms 
change, discuss some basic issues, 
argue that progress will depend on 
the development of a comprehensive 
quantitative theory of the initiation 
and spread of norms (and ultimately 
all elements of culture), and introduce 
some preliminary models that 
examine the spread of norms in space 
or on social networks. Most models 
of complex systems are meant to 
extract signal from noise, suppressing 
extraneous detail and thereby allowing 
an examination of the inﬂ  uence of 
the dominant forces that drive the 
dynamics of pattern and process. To 
this end, models necessarily introduce 
some extreme simplifying assumptions. 
Early attempts to model cultural 
evolution have searched for parallels 
of the population genetic models used 
to analyze genetic evolution. A popular 
analogy, both tempting and facile, has 
been that there are cultural analogues 
of genes, termed “memes” [22,23], 
which function as replicable cultural 
units. Memes can be ideas, behaviors, 
patterns, units of information, and 
so on. But the differences between 
genes and memes makes the analogy 
inappropriate, and “memetics” has 
not led to real understanding of 
cultural evolution. Genes are relatively 
stable, mutating rarely, and those 
changes that do occur usually result in 
nonfunctional products. In contrast, 
memes are extremely mutable, often 
transforming considerably with each 
transmission. Among humans, genes 
can only pass unidirectionally from 
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one generation to the next (vertically), 
normally through intimate contact. 
But ideas (or “memes”) now regularly 
pass between individuals distant from 
each other in space and time, within 
generations, and even backwards 
through generations. Through 
mass media or the Internet, a single 
individual can inﬂ  uence millions of 
others within a very short period of 
time. Individuals have no choice in 
what genes they incorporate into their 
store of genetic information, and 
the storage is permanent. But we are 
constantly ﬁ  ltering what will be added 
to our stored cultural information, and 
our ﬁ  lters even differentiate according 
to the way the same idea is presented 
[24,25]. People often deliberately 
reduce the store of data (for example, 
when computer disks are erased, 
old books and reprints discarded, 
etc.), or do so involuntarily, as when 
unreinforced names or telephone 
numbers are dropped from memory. 
Such qualitative differences, among 
others, ensure that simple models of 
cultural evolution based on the analogy 
to genetic evolution will fail to capture 
a great deal of the relevant dynamics. 
A model framework addressed to the 
speciﬁ  c challenges of cultural evolution 
is needed. 
In the models discussed below, 
the most basic assumption is that 
the spread (or not) of norms shares 
important characteristics with epidemic 
diseases. In particular, as with diseases, 
norms spread horizontally and 
obliquely [14], as well as vertically, 
through infectious transfer mediated 
by webs of contact and inﬂ  uence. As 
with infectious diseases, norms may 
wax and wane, just as the popularity of 
norms is subject to sudden transitions 
[3]. On the other hand, there are 
unique features of cultural transmission 
not adequately captured by disease 
models, in particular the issue of “self-
constructed” knowledge, which has 
long been a source of interest, and 
the development of problem-solving 
models in psychology ([26, 27]; D. 
Prentice, personal communication). 
New syntheses are clearly required.
Microscopic Dynamic
Substantial progress has been 
made toward the development of 
a mathematical theory of cultural 
transmission, most notably by Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman [14], and Boyd 
and Richerson [11]. Cavalli-Sforza 
and Feldman consider the interplay 
between heritable genetic change and 
cultural change. This is an important 
question, addressed to the longer time 
scale, with a view to understanding the 
genetic evolution of characteristics that 
predispose individuals to act in certain 
ways in speciﬁ  ed situations. For many 
of the phenomena of interest, however, 
individual behaviors have not evolved 
speciﬁ  cally within the limited context 
of a single kind of challenge, but in 
response to a much more general 
class of problems. Efforts to provide 
genetic evolutionary explanations 
for human decisions today within the 
narrow contexts in which they occur 
may be frustrated because generalized 
responses to evolutionary forces in the 
distant past have lost optimality, or even 
adaptive value. Extant human behaviors 
for example may be the relics of 
adaptations to conditions in the distant 
past, when populations were smaller 
and technology less advanced. Attempts 
to understand them as adaptive in 
current contexts may therefore be 
futile. Thus, we prefer to take the 
genetic determinants of human 
behavior (that, for example, we react 
strongly to visual stimuli) as givens, 
and to ask rather how those initial 
conditions shape individual and social 
learning [3]. Similar efforts have been 
undertaken by others, such as Henrich 
and Boyd [28] and Kendal et al. [20].
The sorts of models put forth by 
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, Boyd and 
Richerson, and others are a beginning 
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Figure 1.
(A) Long-term patterning in the dynamics of two opinions for the threshold voter model 
with a low threshold.
(B) Long-term patterning in the dynamics of two opinions for the threshold voter model 
with a high threshold. Note the existence of small, frozen clusters.
(C) Long-term patterning in the dynamics of two opinions for the threshold voter model 
with an intermediate threshold. Note the clear emergence of group structure.
(D) Long-term patterning in a model of social group formation, in which individuals 
imitate the opinions of others in their (two) groups, and others of similar opinions, and 
may switch groups when their views deviate from group norms.PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org 0945
towards the examination of a colossal 
problem. To such approaches, we must 
add efforts to understand ideation 
(how an idea for a behavior that 
becomes a norm gets invented in ﬁ  rst 
place), and ﬁ  ltering (which ideas are 
accepted and which are rejected). How 
many ideas just pop up in someone’s 
brain like a mutation? How many are 
slowly assembled from diverse data in a 
single mind? How many are the result 
of group “brainstorming?” How, for 
example, did an idea like the existence 
of an afterlife ﬁ  rst get generated? Why 
do ideas spread, and what facilitates or 
limits that spread? What determines 
which ideas make it through 
transmission ﬁ  lters? Why are broadly 
held norms, like religious observance, 
most often not universal (why, for 
instance, has atheism always existed 
[29,30])? Ideas may be simply stated, 
or argued for, but transmission does 
not necessarily entail the reception or 
adoption of behaviors based on the 
idea, e.g., [31]. What we accept, and 
what gets stored in long-term memory, 
is but a tiny sample of a bombardment 
of candidate ideas, and understanding 
the nature and origin of ﬁ  lters is 
obviously one key to understanding 
the life spans of ideas and associated 
behaviors once generated. 
The Emergence of Higher-Level 
Structure: Some Simple Models
Our ﬁ  lters usually are themselves 
products of cultural evolution, just 
as degrees of resistance of organisms 
to epidemics are products of genetic 
evolution. Filters include the perceived 
opinions of others, especially those 
viewed as members of the same self-
deﬁ  ned social group, which collectively 
attempt to limit deviance [32–34]. 
“Conformist transmission,” deﬁ  ned 
as the tendency to imitate the most 
frequent behavior in the population, 
can help stabilize norms [28] and 
indeed can be the principal mechanism 
underlying the endogenous emergence 
of norms. The robustness of norms 
can arise either from the slow time 
scales on which group norms shift, 
or from the inherent resistance of 
individuals to changing their opinions. 
In the simplest exploration of this, 
Durrett and Levin (unpublished 
data) have examined the dynamics 
of the “threshold” voter model, in 
which individuals change their views 
if the proportion of neighbors with a 
different opinion exceeds a speciﬁ  ed 
threshold. Where the threshold is low, 
individuals are continually changing 
their opinions, and groups cannot 
form (Figure 1A). In contrast, at high 
thresholds, stickiness is high—opinions 
rarely change—and the system quickly 
becomes frozen (Figure 1B). Again, 
groups cannot form. In between, 
however, at intermediate thresholds 
(pure conformist transmission), 
groups form and persist (Figure 1C). 
In the simplest such models in two 
dimensions, unanimity of opinions will 
eventually occur, but only over much 
longer time periods than those of 
group formation (see also [20]). When 
the possibility of innovation (mutation) 
is introduced in a model that considers 
linkages among traits and group labels, 
and where individuals can shift groups 
when their views deviate from group 
norms sufﬁ  ciently, multiple opinions 
and multiple groups can persist, 
essentially, indeﬁ  nitely (Figure 1D).
The formation of groups is the ﬁ  rst 
step in the emergence of normative 
behavior; the work of Durrett and 
Levin shows that this can occur 
endogenously, caused by no more 
than a combination of ideation and 
imitation. The existence of a threshold 
helps to stabilize these groups, and 
to increase stickiness; furthermore, 
if threshold variation is permitted 
within populations, these thresholds 
can coevolve with group dynamics. 
What will the consequences be for the 
size distribution of groups, and for 
their persistence? Will group stability 
increase, while average size shrinks? 
What will be the consequences of 
allowing different individuals to have 
different thresholds, or of allowing 
everyone’s thresholds to change with 
the size of the group? When payoffs 
reward individuals who adhere to 
group norms, and when individuals 
have different thresholds, will those 
thresholds evolve? The answers to such 
questions could provide deep insights 
into the mechanisms underlying the 
robustness of norms, and are ripe for 
investigation through such simple and 
transparent mathematical models. 
Modeling may also shed light on 
why some norms (like fashions) 
change so easily, while others (like 
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Box 1. Sample Hypotheses about the Evolution of Norms
Hypothesis 1. Evolution of technological norms will generally be more rapid than 
that of ethical norms. 
Technological changes are generally tested promptly against environmental 
conditions—a round wheel wins against a hexagonal one every time, and the 
advantages of adopting it are clear to all. Ethical systems, on the other hand cannot 
often be tested against one another, and the standards of success are not only generally 
undetermined, they often vary from observer to observer and are the subject of ongoing 
controversy among philosophers.
Hypothesis 2. In societies with nonreligious art, the evolution of norms in art will be 
more rapid than those in religion.
We hypothesize that art is less important to the average individual than his or her 
basic system of relating to the world, and conservatism in the latter would be culturally 
adaptive (leading to success within a culture).
Hypothesis 3. Military norms will change more in defeated nations than victorious 
ones. 
Was the Maginot Line and the generally disastrous performance of the French army in 
1940 an example of a more general rule? Does success generally breed conservatism?
Hypothesis 4. The spread of a norm is not independent of the spread of others, but 
depends on the spread of other norms (norm clusters).
Does, for example, empathy decrease with social stratiﬁ  cation? 
Hypothesis 5. Susceptibility to the spread of norms is negatively correlated with level 
of education. 
Are the less educated generally more conformist, or does the spread of norms depend 
almost entirely on the character of the norm? 
Hypothesis 6. Horizontal transmission will show less stickiness than vertical 
transmission. 
This conjecture is based on anecdotal observations that norms like using hula hoops 
come and go and are primarily horizontally transmitted, and religious values and other 
high-viscosity points of view are mostly vertically transmitted (p. 129 of [14], [59]).PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org 0946
foot binding in imperial China) 
persist over centuries, and more 
generally on how tastes and practices 
evolve in societies. Norms in art 
and music change rapidly and with 
little apparent effort at persuasion 
or coercion. But three-quarters of a 
century of communism barely dented 
the religious beliefs of many Russians, 
despite draconian attempts to suppress 
them [35], and several centuries of 
science have apparently not affected 
the belief of a large number of 
Americans in angels and creationism 
(e.g., [36,37]). Then there are the 
near-universal norms, such as the rules 
against most types of physical assault 
or theft within groups that, although 
they vary in their speciﬁ  cs, are 
interpreted as necessary to preserve 
functional societies. Group-selection 
explanations for such phenomena 
(e.g., [12]) are, we argue, neither 
justiﬁ  ed nor necessary (see also pp. 
221-225 of [38], [39]). Such behaviors 
can emerge from individual-based 
models, simply involving rewards to 
individuals who belong to groups. 
There are degrees: the evolution 
of cooperation is facilitated by tight 
interactions, for example when 
individuals interact primarily with 
their nearest neighbors [40,41], and 
the payoffs that come to individuals 
from such cooperation can enhance 
the tightness of interactions and 
the formation of groups. This easily 
explains why mutually destructive 
behaviors, like murder, are almost 
universally proscribed. Group beneﬁ  ts 
can emerge, and can enhance these 
effects, but it is neither necessary nor 
likely that group selection among 
groups for these behaviors overrides 
individual selection within groups when 
these groups are not composed of 
closely related individuals [42].
Simple models could address such 
things as the role of contagion in 
cultural evolution, recognized in one 
of the ﬁ  rst works on psychology [43] 
in the context of religious revivals and 
belief, as what has been described 
as “pious contagion” (p. 10 of [30]). 
But models must also address issues 
such as the roles of authority or moral 
entrepreneurs (individuals engaged 
in changing a norm) [32], to say 
nothing of the impacts of advertising 
and the norm-changing efforts of the 
entertainment and other industries. 
In reality, we are intentioned agents 
who act with purpose. In maturing, 
we master the norms that have been 
evolved over a long period, but to 
which we may adapt in different 
ways and even (in the case of moral 
entrepreneurs) strive to change. 
For a moral entrepreneur, a 
group that is too small may have 
little inﬂ  uence and be not worth 
joining. But large groups may be 
too difﬁ  cult to inﬂ  uence, so also 
may not be worth joining. For 
such individuals, there is likely an 
optimal group size, depending on 
the change the individual wants to 
effect. Groups also introduce ancillary 
beneﬁ  ts of membership that change 
the equation. Such considerations 
inﬂ  uence decisions such as whether to 
join a third party effort in a political 
campaign; understanding the interplay 
between individual decisions and the 
dynamics of party sizes is a deeply 
important and fascinating question, 
with strong ecological analogies. 
Groups, collectively, must also 
wrestle with the costs and beneﬁ  ts 
of increasing membership, thereby 
enhancing inﬂ  uence while potentially 
diminishing consensus and hence the 
perceived beneﬁ  ts to members.
Innovation and Conservatism
Cultural evolution, like biological 
evolution, contains what we like to call 
the “paradox of viscosity.” Evolving 
organisms must balance the need 
to change at an appropriate rate in 
response to varying environmental 
conditions against the need to maintain 
a functioning phenome. This trade-off 
between conservatism and adaptability, 
between stability and exploration, 
is one of the central problems in 
evolutionary theory. For example, how 
much change can there be in the genes 
required to maintain adaptation in a 
caterpillar without lethally affecting 
the structure and functioning of the 
butterﬂ  y (p. 303 of [44])? Conservatism 
in religion might be explained by 
the lack of empirical tests of religious 
ideas. But even in military technology 
and tactics, where empirical tests 
are superabundant, changes are 
slower than might be expected. For 
example, the British high command 
in World War I did not react rapidly 
to the realities of barbed wire, massed 
artillery, and machine guns [45]. Even 
so, the conservatism of the generals 
may be overrated [46]. 
Macroscopic Dynamics
We have thus far examined the 
evolution of norms in isolation—as how 
the views of individuals (and thus the 
constituents of a pool of nongenetic 
information) change through time. But 
everywhere in common discourse and 
technical literature, it is assumed that 
norms are bundled into more or less 
discrete packages we call cultures, and 
that those packages themselves evolve. 
Recall that everyday notions such as 
that American culture of the 1990s was 
very different from that of the 1960s, 
that Islamic culture did not undergo 
the sort of reformation that convulsed 
Christian culture (for example, 
[47]), and that Alexander the Great 
carried Greek culture throughout the 
Mediterranean and as far east as Persia. 
The problem of deﬁ  ning “cultures” 
in cultural evolution seems analogous 
to that of deﬁ  ning “species” (or other 
categories) in genetic evolution. There 
has been a long and largely fruitless 
argument among taxonomists over the 
latter [48] , and an equally fruitless 
debate in anthropology (and biology) 
on the deﬁ  nition of culture [39, 49–57]. 
Again, we suggest that the parsing of 
the various inﬂ  uences that create and 
sustain norms and cultures are ripe 
for theoretical modeling, but it must 
begin to incorporate the full richness 
on multiple scales of space, time, 
and complexity. Durrett and Levin 
[3] develop a model integrating the 
dynamics of clusters of linked opinions 
and group membership; appropriate 
extensions would allow group 
characteristics to evolve as well, but on 
slower time scales. The oversimplicity 
of models of symmetric imitation 
on regular grids, as represented in 
our simple models, must give way to 
those that incorporate ﬁ  tnesses and 
feedbacks, as well as asymmetries and 
power brokers, on more complex 
networks of interaction [58].
Challenges and Hypotheses
One of the major challenges for 
those interested in the evolution of 
norms is, at the most elementary level, 
deﬁ  ning a norm. This is related to 
another general problem of deﬁ  ning 
exactly what is changing in cultural 
evolution—which we might call the 
“meme dilemma” in honor of Dawkins’ 
regrettably infertile notion. A second 
major challenge is discovering the 
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mechanism(s) by which truly novel 
ideas and behaviors are generated and 
spread. A third is discovering the most 
effective ways of changing norms. 
We’ve got a long way to go before 
being able to meet those challenges. 
One place to start is to begin 
formulating hypotheses about the 
evolution of norms that can be tested 
with historical data, modeling, or even 
(in some cases) experiments. Some 
hypotheses we believe worth testing 
(and some of which may well be 
rejected) are given in Box 1.
In this essay we have tried to be 
provocative rather than exhaustive. 
There is a welter of issues we have not 
even attempted to address, including: 
(1) asymmetries of power in the spread 
of norms, (2) the role of networks, (3) 
the efﬁ  cacy of persuasion as opposed to 
imitation, (4) the cause of thresholds 
in the change of norms, (5) the genesis 
of norms during child development, 
(6) the connection between attitudes 
and actions, (8) competition among 
norms from different cultures; and (9) 
the question, can norms exist “free of 
people” in institutions? Institutions 
certainly may emerge as independent 
structures, stabilized by laws and 
customs that are enforced to varying 
degrees through formal punishment or 
social pressure. Can such norms persist 
long even when adherence to them is 
disappearing? The interplay between 
the dynamics of individual behaviors 
and normative rules, operating on 
different time (and other) scales, may 
be the key, we argue, to understanding 
sudden phase transitions that can 
transform the cultural landscape.
We hope that, by being provocative, 
we can interest more evolutionists, 
behavioral biologists, and ecologists 
in tackling the daunting but crucial 
problems of cultural evolution. Few 
issues in science would seem to be 
more pressing if civilization is to 
survive.  
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